Abstract

Being aware of complex situation in the beginning of the nineties, Slobodan Milosevic concentrated from day to day more and more power by using different strategic approach in appealing to different social groups. From the beginning, his reign was, apart from being partly based on majority inhabitant's support, strongly based on a three more supporting pillars: nationalized industry, heavy controlled media and the strong and loyal apparatus of repression - secret and regular police. In such a way, as support of the people decreased so did repression increase. In my opinion, Slobodan Milosevic wasn't orthodox communist, populist, nationalist and national-chauvinist. These were only tools that he used in right moments, acting more pragmatically rather than ideologically, to came to, and latter to stay on power. I find that Slobodan Milosevic heavily influenced on drastic rise of the tensions in the region by exercising his uncompromising style and intolerance. Even more, he is the one who has to be blamed most for civil wars with its tragic consequences in former Yugoslavia . However, he was not alone. He initiated conflicts on witch Croatian, Bosniak-Muslim and Albanian leaderships reacted merciless and furiously. More exactly, four sides committed war crimes, but only one side is, in my opinion, on trial.

Key words: decentralization, autonomy, national-chauvinism, populism, war, economic crises.

 

After the years of suffer, violence and humiliation, maybe it is right time to ask how those dramatic events took place and why we were forced to experience it. Basic question of my study is:

How Slobodan Milosevic came to power and how he succeeded to stay on power for another ten years ?

Latter I will analyze mechanisms through which he gathered political strength and consequences of his reign on performance of Yugoslav economy in period 1990-2000.

 

Nation and Nationalism

At the very beginning of my work I would like to try (although it is not an easy task), by using few in my opinion more-less comprehensive definitions, to define nation and nationalism in order to avoid terminology confusion when using nationalism and national-chauvinism:

Nation

"Derived from the Latin ‘natio' the basic term seems to indicate a people related by birth and the quality of innateness would seem to be vital in its meaning." (L. Snyder)

"The nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. [It] consists of two things. One is the common legacy of rich memories from the past. The other is the present consensus, the will to live together." (Renan cited in Davies 1997)

"Nation - a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a single territorial economy, and common rights and duties for all its members." (A. Smith)

 

Nationalism

By nationalism I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny." (Guibernau 1996)

Nationalism - an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy on behalf of a human population, some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'. (A. Smith 1995)

...nationalism is both an ideology and a movement, usually minority one, which aspires to "nationhood" for chosen group;...nationhood in turn comprises three basic ideals, autonomy and self-government for the group, often but not always in sovereign state, solidarity and fraternity of the group in a recognized territory or "home", and third, a distinctive, and preferably unique, culture and history peculiar to the group in question. (A. Smith cited in Wintrobe 1999)

But in the case when nationalism becomes aggressive and hostile against other nations is, in my view, more appropriate to use term national-chauvinism .

Introduction

Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of the Communist League of Serbia, president of Serbia and president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , has been often characterized as a " communist apparatchik", "radical evil", "national-chauvinist", "populist leader", "merciless nationalist dictator", "the Balkan butcher" and so on. He is the one who has to be blamed (but not the only one) for dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), civil war in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and as a result of Balkan's hell during those painful years, numerous human victims who lost their lives, families, friends, property and houses. In addition, repression he has been using for years against citizens of Serbia must not be omitted. Milosevic's raise, at the beginnings of the nineties, was partly based on majority inhabitant's support. But, from the start, his reign was strongly based on a three more supporting pillars: nationalized industry, heavy controlled media and the strong and loyal apparatus of repression - secret and regular police. In such a way, as support of the people decreased so did repression increase. In other words, he usurped domestic national natural resources and industrial and agricultural capacities, citizens old currency savings, he occupied and heavily controlled media, isolated Serbia from foreign influences and often fiercely and merciless, using his apparatus of repression, clashed with the political opponents and independent journalists.

 

 

Economic and Political Background (1945-1987)

Founder of the post war Yugoslavia was leader of the partisans and the Communist League of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito. His plan was to create united state of South-Slavs. To do so, in order to avoid historically rooted hostilities between Serbs and Croats, as well as Serbs, Albanians and Bosniak- Muslims, Tito organized post war Yugoslavia as highly centrally-governed state. Consistently, functioning of economy was based on classical etatist model. Stepping out from a broader socialist community led by Soviet Union in 1948 Yugoslavia received significant economic and military assistance from the West. The main economic donors were United States , International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. First steps toward decentralization were not made at political, but at the field of the economy. In other words in the beginning of the fifties Tito introduced new model of governing economy. In contrast to Stalin's centrally planned economic system, where all enterprises were state owned, SFRY made it's own, very new path of development. The ownership over enterprises was transferred to the workers. Special bodies were founded in each enterprise (Worker's Councils) with aim to prepare workers to take part in management and to reconcile everlasting opponents - workers and managers. More exactly, it was attempt to create atmosphere of satisfied workers (who were the main and most numerous supporters as well as the base of communist system) that were at the same time owners, producers and managers. In that period economy of SFRY had experienced very high economic growth (among the highest in the world), accompanied with rapid urbanization, industrialization and welfare state enforcement during economic upward cycle. Living standard in Yugoslavia was higher than ever. It has to be point out that dynamic economic growth hadn't occurred thanks to decentralization of decision making down to the level of firm, but to external financial support. That is the sources of growth were external while economic growth were extensive in nature. Consistently, the investments were at very low efficiency level. Also, egalitarian ideologies of self-management ( vs. both socialist etatism and capitalism) as well as non-alignment politics were broadly accepted.

First attempts towards open market economy and decentralization took part in period 1965-1971. Aim was to introduce commodity and service market, but not the market of labor and capital. Also, the idea was to place major part of yearly enterprises' income at economic subjects' free disposal. As to the banks, they were about to reform from state service to subjects that operate on the basis of economic criteria. In the first step, the reform of 1965 resulted in reduction of industrial production and increased social inequality. The reform endangered foundations of socialist system. Consequently, political elite prevented further development in the direction of relative liberalization of the economy. However, the resistance to reform came from many other sources. The results of the reform didn't fit well prevailing egalitarian sentiments and soon political protest spread over the country, involving not only the poor, but also the major part of middle class. Even the supposedly modernizing social group of university students and professors in Belgrade formed "red opposition " against moderate pro-market economic reform. At the same time, students' demonstrations in Zagreb were nationalist in character. Simultaneously, this was the moment when hidden ethnic competition between the elites of former Yugoslav republics started and was about to be recognized through the new constitutional arrangements.

In my opinion, there was no real decisiveness in implementing a reform because Tito and his clique saw decentralization of economic governance as a powerful tool to suppress national feelings. According to the law of that time, whichever kind of expressing and/or emphasizing national and/or religious differences was strictly prohibited. In such a way encouraged by relatively peaceful fifties and sixties regarding national tensions, Yugoslav communists proudly claimed that they successfully solved national problem in their multinational country. Leading Yugoslav elites saw established social structure as a final victory against classes. What is more, communist doctrine emphasized dominance class over national struggle. They believed that once proletheriat develop its own class-consciousness, national identity and feelings of national belonging would vanish. According to this doctrine, Yugoslav communists tried to develop Yugoslav identity based on "brotherhood and unity" of all nations and national minorities. But SFRY consisted of six constitutional republics where territory was divided according to the national key. More exactly, SFRY wasn't state based on class identity as communist leaders thought or more accurate wanted to think, but national and ethnic identity.

Anyway, at the late sixties (1968-1969), for the first time after WWII, political elites of that time started to exert permanently growing pressures, not only for economic, but also for political decentralization. The most persistent in those claims were more developed republics, Croatia and Slovenia . What is more, in this period Bosniak-Muslims were recognized as a separate nationality and began intensive campaign for extension of wider political powers to Serbian provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Most intensive pressure exerted ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Historically, after WWII Kosovo received regional autonomy within the Republic of Serbia . Consistently, Kosovo, centrally administrated by the Republic of Serbia , hadn't have Supreme Court, independent legislative and local provincial administration. Constitution of 1963 granted Kosovo status of autonomous province (as well as Vojvodina) witch accounted greater political autonomy. Furthermore, the Provincial Assembly and Supreme Court were established. But this was not the end to ambitions of Albanians. They wanted to acquire status of Republic. To achieve it in 1968 Albanian political leaders organized riot.

The first one who reacted on Albanian pressure was well-known Serbian writer as well as the loyal intellectual of regime Dobrica Cosic. He argued that claims that called for autonomy of Kosovo led to expansion of Albanian nationalism that had already developed to great extent. At the same time, he expressed concerns about possibly tragic consequences of growing out-migration of Kosovo Serbs from the region under the pressure and threats of Albanian secessionists.

However, under the pressure of Albanian riot, through Constitutional Amendments of 1971 and latter new Constitution of 1974 Serbian autonomous provinces were granted with similar, but not equal status with constitutional republics. In accordance with the new Constitution, Kosovo brought its own Constitution. In addition, Kosovo was granted with sovereign rights at the federal and republic level. In other words, with right to veto or block legislation that they didn't support at the Federal Executive Council, Kosovars were in position to decide equally with other republics at the federal level. What is more, Constitution of 1974 allowed Provincial Assembly to decide about federal foreign policy, to establish their own National Bank, to establish own administration apparatus totally independent from the Serbian or federal one. At the end, most importantly, Provincial Assembly could veto any legislation regard to economic policy, taxation, education and culture, within the framework of the Republic of Serbia . In other words, majority population governed Kosovo - in this case Albanians (70% of Kosovo's population). Consistently, Albanians were dominant in political bodies, enterprises management, legislation system and police. Most of the Serbs, who were the victims of their hostility and who could at the same time clearly remember Albanian genocide carried out against Serbs during WWII, felt that their survival in Kosovo was imperiled. Under such circumstances, according to estimation of the Serbian government, in ten year period between 1971-1981 about 57 000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo. On the other hand, Kosovo authorities argued that migration was due, not to violence, threats, plunders and ethnic and institutional discrimination carried out by Albanian extremists against Serbs and Montenegrins, but to difficult economic situation - concrete high unemployment rate, housing shortage and lack of educational opportunities.

All in all, Constitution of 1974 followed economic and now political tendencies toward further state decentralization, primarily through the principal of consensus for all key decisions at the federal level and primacy of republican over federal laws. Also, it is very important to say that according to Constitution only nationalities (and not national minorities) were bearer of the right on self-determination and separation.

Serbian intellectual elite saw new Constitution as opposite to interests of Serbian nationality because:

? federation wasn't ruled by dominant nation thanks to decision-making process that was based on principal of consensus. This meant that, not only that the power in decision making was equally distributed among republics, but also that thanks to granted wide autonomy to Serbian provinces, Serbia wasn't able any more to propose at the federal level legislation witch wasn't, for instance in the interest of Albanians, but was in the interests of proper Serbia and

? a lot of Serbian population lived out of borders of Serbia , among traditional enemies. Memories of genocide against Serbs carried out by Croat fascists ( ustasha ) were still fresh.

However, first coordinated attack on the Constitution of 1974 by Serbian political elite took place in 1977 when Serbian party members under the leadership of, in that time one of the most prominent Yugoslav communist, Dragoslav Markovic published document Blue Book . In Blue Book Serbian politicians strongly attacked regional elites of Kosovo and Vojvodina for deliberately putting into effect autonomous legislative, economic and cultural initiatives against interest of proper Serbia and continuous attempts in conducting foreign policy independently. Under such circumstances, in their opinion, Serbs were forced to ask a question about national minorities, position in the federal state and national frontiers. Thanks to veto power on any legislation within the framework of the Republic of Serbia , while highly tolerant to Albanian national-chauvinism, Kosovo authorities prevented theme of Blue Book from being presented at the federal level for discussion.

 

The death of the leader

At the beginning of the eighties three essentially important events happened that resulted in the further rise of the tension in the region:

Firstly on May 1980, father of the Yugoslav state and the nation Josip Broz Tito died.

Having been recognized as a winner in WWII, Tito effected his idea of a Yugoslav nation, where people originating from diverse ethnic groups and religion were united under the leadership of the communist government. Under the leadership of Tito, as I have already said, all social, national and economic tensions have been successfully suppressed for years. What is more, his power to secure coherence of Yugoslavia was astonishing. After Tito's dead function of governing the federal state was taken over by unstable collective presidency consisted of the leaders of Yugoslav Republics ( Serbia , Croatia , Slovenia , Bosnia and Herzegovina , Montenegro and Macedonia ).

Secondly , one year latter under the slogan " Kosovo Republic " large-scaled mass demonstrations of ethnic Albanians broke out in Kosovo. Despite the fact that Kosovo had de facto , Albanian political elites wanted to acquire de jure status of republic. Leaders of the riot argued that denial of de jure status of republic was at the same time denial to recognize Albanians as a nationality, disregarding the fact that Albanians were numerically superior in comparison with some constitutional nationalities like Macedonians and Montenegrins. In addition, in their view, Albanian community within SFRY had developed strong national identity since WWI. Another justification for acquiring de jure status of republic was pure economic by nature. That is Kosovo was the most undeveloped region in SFRY primarily because, in view of the Albanian leaders, the federal economic policy favored most developed republics - proper Serbia , Croatia and Slovenia . Serbian tutelage, with incapable and highly centrally oriented political leadership towards the needs of Serbian nation was, in their opinion, main obstacle for more dynamic economic development of Kosovo. In that way, de jure status of republic for Kosovo would have had positive reflection in the increase of economic initiative and development. Consistently, riot of Albanians was justified, and was the result of the anger that had been accumulating for years after WWII.

On the other hand, according to the Constitution only nationalities could have status of republic. In other words granting a de jure status of republic to Kosovo at the same time meant granting Albanian national minority a status of nationality with indisputable right on self-determination and separation. Consistently, official attitude of Serbian political representatives was that this step would lead to both, territorial and national disintegration. But the essence of the problem was that on Albanian rebellion Serbian authorities answered without strategic approach using various forms of repression - a dozens of demonstrators were killed, beaten, jailed and media were even heavier occupied and controlled. And as it always has been and will be, wave of violence provoked a new wave of violence. Kosovo Serbs became a daily target of so-called "Albanian iredenta" violent attacks. As a result, according to extensive study carried out by Ruza Petrovic and Marina Blagojevic until 1981 103 000 Serbs and Montenegrins migrated out of Kosovo where 17% of that number migrated out in period until 1961, while 83% did it during two critical decades (1961-1981). Further, in period 1981-1987 additional 20 000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo.

Albanian politicians claimed that migration was the result of difficult economic situation and the lack of positive development prospective in future. Despite those claims, the study undoubtedly proved that while the part of the inhabitants left Kosovo for economic reason, most of them did it under the threats to personal safety, threats to property, ethnic discrimination, and institutionalized discrimination (institutions were ruled by majority) of Albanian authorities.

As a result, by 1986 columns of desperate Kosovo Serbs could be seen in front of the Yugoslav Federation Assembly formed in order to attract attention of the Serbian public and the republican and federal leaders. And they made it. As a reaction to the Yugoslav institutional crisis, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) published document Memorandum.

Academicians stand point was that economic policy favored more developed Republics of Croatia and Slovenia witch was not suppressing, taking into consideration the fact that two most powerful creators of post war Yugoslavia were Croat (Tito's father was Croat and mother Slovenian) and Slovenian (Edvard Kardelj). In their view, as the largest nationality among the constitutive nationalities, Serbs were supposed to be dominant in governing the federal state. However, by adoption of Constitution of 1974, the role of Serbs within the federation was marginalized. Furthermore, despite the fact that during WWII have been victims of Croatian terror and genocide, while over represented in partisans, Serbs were now forced to cultural assimilation within Croatia . Most importantly, Kosovo Serbs were the victims of physical, cultural, political and legal genocide. Consequently, in order to protect Serbian nationality, the current crisis in Kosovo had to be solved urgently.

Memorandum was supported by the Orthodox Church and Association of Writers of Serbia and in parallel strongly attacked by non-Serbian communist that accused Serbian party for demonstrating excessive tolerance against Serbian nationalism.

Lastly , domestic economy under the pressure of structural adjustment and heavy external indebtedness suffered a severe crisis. Economic system was grounded on social property based free association of labor and rights of those who produce to direct social assets. There was no place for property incomes (interests, rents, profit or dividends). Distributive function of the plan was replaced by a direct role of social agreement, and the market function was replaced by self-management agreement among enterprises. Economic strategy was focused on developing sectors for producing power, raw materials, food, chemicals and textiles. System was autarchy oriented, that is towards resident's need, while surplus was directed to export. Consequently, large structural disproportions, that were obvious in the beginning of eighties, resulted in sharp decrease in economic growth, efficiency and productivity; significant deficits in trade and balance of payments; lack of energy, raw and reproduction materials; inflation etc. The "Long-term Program of Economic Stabilization" (1982) represented another attempt to solve accumulated difficulties. The idea was to affirm market mechanisms (although limited to commodity market), and to increase the autonomy of economy against state. In practice this attempt was a rotten compromise with old system. None of basic systemic changes has been accomplished. The crucial self-management institutions remained unchanged.

The severness of the crises can be easily detected by examining basic economic indicators during the period 1980-1990: average increase in social product (of social owned sector) was 0.6% (while for instance in the period 1966-1975 it was 5.8% and 1976-1980 it was 5.6% ) was followed with increase in employment for 1,9%. Productivity decreased at average rate of 1.2%, average decreasing rate in fixed investments was 5.5% (fixed investments dropped in 1989 to only 15-16% of the social product) while efficiency of capital investments was at the very low level (negative marginal capital coefficient in 1983, 1987, 1988). Further, average inflation rate was high (84%), as well as rate of unemployment (in 1990 15. 9% of total working capable labor force). What is more Tito's death coincided with the external indebtedness crisis. Huge foreign debt in 1980 reached 17.347 billion US dollars. A ggravating circumstance was that it was also the year when SFRY had to begin with paying off not only the interest, but also the great deal of the principal. As for the foreign trade, balance of payments deficit was sharply reduced thanks not only to increased export, but also to limited import, spending the foreign currency reserves and increase in short-term borrowing.

Inequality in income distribution was significant. As a result poverty increased drastically (in 1987. 25% of total inhabitants were classified below the poverty line) especially among workers. Consistently, workers were disappointed about weakness of existing political elites to end the crisis. This was the fertile ground for appearance of the populism amongst labor force.

To sum up, in the beginning of the 1987 Serbian political leadership was faced with serious difficulties:

0 decentralization of the federal state and growing pressures by more developed republics to continue with it

0 opposite tendencies within local political scene: growing internal pressures for the centralization of the power at the federal and republic level as well, in order to protect Serbian national interests.

0 growing national-chauvinism

0 strong demands for ending the economic crisis and initiation of economic reforms as well as greater social justice.

In such circumstances, it seems to me that first one who realized how to simultaneously deal with those problems and at the same time come to practically unlimited power was Slobodan Milosevic.

 

The rise of the national-chauvinism

Slobodan Milosevic made his first political step in 1984 when president of the Serbian Communist Party and his mentor Ivan Stambolic promoted him to a head of the City Comitie of Belgrade. Ivan Stambolic, the leader of Serbian communists, got into the solving accumulated difficulties at the federal as well as republic level in order to preserve Tito's Yugoslavia . In his speeches he called for "brotherhood and unity", equality of all constitutional republics and decisive fight against both, Serbian and Albanian nationalism. As for the economic situation, he presented himself as proponent of economic reforms within the frame of self-management socialism.

In his beginnings, Milosevic loyally supported his mentor advocating for the preserving of SFRY and the leading role of the Communist League of Yugoslavia. Two years after, in 1986, Milosevic was promoted to the head of Serbian Communist Party. A first sign of Milosevic's coming out from the Stambolic's moderate and conciliatory forces became obvious during the first half of 1987 when he didn't join anti-Memorandum campaign conducted by his mentor. It appears that he was patiently waiting for the right moment to take control over the Serbian communists. As it turned out, his stance on the Memorandum was the main reason of his clash with Ivan Stambolic.

The moment when he definitely gained enough power to overthrow Stambolic and his followers happened, it seems unexpectedly, on April 24, 1987 during his visit of small town of Kosovo Polje . He was sent there to calm down Serbs that protested against Albanian terror. Circumstances favored the fact that it was one more visit of uninterested member of Serbian political leadership. But when he saw that police of Kosovo (predominantly Albanian) beat back thousands of Serbs who wanted to meet him, he suddenly declared: " No one has the right to beat you. No one will ever beat you again." What was most impressive for Kosovo Serbs was the fact that he was the first Serbian politician that spoke with the passion concerning Kosovo problem. He instantly gained unreserved support of all Kosovo Serbs and wider, all Serbian nationalists throughout the federal state. New gained popularity made him capable to conduct a purge within the party. His mentor was among the first who was expelled from the party, and at the same time dismissed from the position of the president of the Republic of Serbia under the accusations of indecisiveness in struggle against Albanian separatist and lack of Titoist eagerness in confronting internal class enemies. In that time Milosevic didn't declared himself as a nationalist yet. Being aware of complexity of the situation he concentrated from day to day more and more power by using different strategic approach in appealing to different social groups. For orthodox communists and powerful army generals he promoted devotion to ideals of Tito's Yugoslavia , primacy of Serbian interest for nationalist, anti-bureaucratic and economic reforms for intellectuals and economic reforms and greater social justice for workers. That is he was by "selling odds and ends" won over the masses.

At the very beginning his main goal was to take over power within the federal state. In order to achieve it as soon as possible, he started to agitate for tightening of "democratic centralism" within the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, great reduction of republic's power and decentralization of the federal state. Consistently, during the next three years, by political plotting inside the party, he overthrew the leadership of Vojvodina (October 1988), Kosovo (November 1988) and Montenegro (January 1989). Furthermore, he adopted Amendments to the Constitution of Serbia (March 1989) and latter the new Constitution of Serbia in September 1990 (despite the fact that it was against Yugoslav Constitution of 1974) that abolished autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. His first (and last attempt) to change institutional organization at the federal level in order to secure dominant position for Serbia (for himself), took place at the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (20-22 January). As a sign of disagreement, first Slovenian and after it Croatian delegation left the meeting. Axis that so-so kept Tito's Yugoslavia in life, the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, has been broken up. Attempt to take over power at the federal level didn't give any results. He was forced to find another solution for monopolizing power.

In the same month the new federal prime minister and strong political opponent to Slobodan Milosevic, Ante Markovic, introduced the program of economic reforms. Ante Markovic, highly popular pro-Yugoslav and pro-European oriented economist was decisive in attention to end up the crisis. His program represented a step towards introduction of integral market consisting of commodity and service market, capital and labor market, private property, with respect for the fully open economy and full integration into international economy. However, price stabilization as the first step of the reform was incapable of producing permanent results primarily because of absence of essential structural changes and hard budget constrain as a basic principle of market operating. Yet, the process of transition was initiated. The model of privatization favored interests of insiders (workers and managers). Marković's populist model leant largely on the doctrine of accumulated years of service. High discounts and inflation strongly influenced the interest of employees to take over ownership over enterprises through salaries, which contributed to privatization euphoria (1200 enterprises during 1990 and 1991). On the other hand, the program was heavily undermined by existing republic political elites, especially from Serbia , Croatia and Slovenia as well as generals of Yugoslav army who saw Markovic as a factor that could destroy their dominance. At the same time, within the internal, Serbian political scene, Milosevic's positions began to be seriously endangered by new central and right wing political parties.

Under these adverse circumstances regarding his power, Milosevic unexpectedly received generous gift: in the first multy-parity elections after WWII in all republics won nationalist oriented parties. The national parties in territory of the former Yugoslavia , started from the fact that their survival required a reliable support of power more than successful political programs and at the same time they channeled the mass media to create an atmosphere in the public opinion wherein the other could only be an enemy. Individuals as a response to growing feeling of social and political insecurity approached to the their ethnicities for support and protection. This could only intensify the social conflicts.

 

Civil war within the borders of former Yugoslavia

Serbs, especially those who lived in Croatia , were shocked when Franjo Tudjman, whose nationalism was based to great extent on the fascist ideology of ustasha, won power. A threat of ustasha terror against Serbs during the WWII reappeared. Serbian fear was rational. Having took power over Croatia , Tudjman unilateraly and against the law (as well as Milosevic did in September 1990) on 22 December brought the new Constitution of Croatia. The new Constitution deprived Serbs of nationality status in Croatia . As a national minority, Serbs didn't have right on self-determination. Under the growing danger, Serbs from Croatia that felt helpless swarmed to their fatherland, on the Milosevic's warm lap. And he was more than willing to accept them. During these events, Slobodan Milosevic stayed calm, and didn't stop to call for peace and unity. This was the wise strategy to won over communist oriented officers of the Yugoslav People's Army. Soon after, Serbian communists agreed with the army generals that confederation of six republics without proper state with single citizenship (Yugoslav), boarders, leadership, army, market and currency, wasn't acceptable. As a result, in order to preserve united Yugoslavia , Slobodan Milosevic in cooperation with army officers began to prepare strategy for military intervention. When Milosevic's intention became obvious, more exactly that all Serbs witch lived within the territory of SFRY would, disregarding price, live in the same country, Serbs that lived out of borders of Republic of Serbia felt relief. As a counterpart, strong hostile feelings against Serbs flourished among Croats, Slovenians and Muslims.

Finally, in March 1991 the war out broke in Slovenia and Croatia and soon after, namely in April 1992, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) . Milosevic initiated conflicts, and his enemies reacted furiously. The conflicts escalated into violence sowing death and destruction: many innocent people was killed, tortured, imprisoned and left without home. Whole political system broke down and opened wide doors for ruling elites to demand organization of their respective ethnic communities as sovereign states

International community reacted by imposing very restrictive sanctions to Serbia in 1992. This was the fact that Milosevic used to justify very difficult economic situation. In parallel, he launched the anti-European campaign, attacking International community for the heavy economic crisis in Serbia and exercising one-sided approach to conflict by accusing only Serbian people for starting the war and committed war crimes.

Overburden by war, imposed sanctions and drastic increase in poverty during 1993 and 1994 the political and economic situation in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) deteriorated sharply. Very high unemployment rate and hyperinflation resulted in reduce inhabitants to poverty. Masses were already exhausted and tired not only of the war, but also of the national-chauvinism. From the middle of 1993 onwards, listening in the vox populi , in order to stay on power, Milosevic gave up the idea of Greater Serbia . Consistently, he started more and more intensively to call for peace, representing himself as a "factor of stability " in region. What is more in 1994 and 1995 he was thought by the western politicians involved in civil war in former Yugoslavia as the leader whose role in the achieving peace was irreplaceable. War was closing to end.

In May 1995, with abundant logistic help of U.S. army, Croatian military forces successfully carried out war operations Bljesak (Flash , in Western Slavonia ) and in August Oluja (Storm , in the large region of Knin). Consequently, apart from numerous victims and burnt down houses, about 250 000 Serbs were forced to migrate out of Croatia . In parallel, during the July and August, united Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim military forces carried out offensive in southwestern part of Republica Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina . A large part of this region, where lived predominantly Serbs, was occupied. Once the balance in negotiating positions was established, peace negotiations took place.

War was officially finished in November 1995 when the leaders of conflicted sides, namely Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, after terrible war crimes had been committed, agreed to sign up the Dayton Accords. The military, political and security processes in the central and most vulnerable part of former Yugoslav territory have since been crucially determined by the implementation of the Dayton Accords. In addition, dictators and the biggest war criminals of the region (Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic) were now supported by the West. Practically, in the elections for federal parliament and local authorities that took place in Serbia at the end of 1996, vote for Milosevic's party was at the same time vote for peace. Logically, his party and its allies won the victory for the federal parliament. But, as a result of growing discontent among voters (because of the corruption, self-enrichment, repression and poverty), Milosevic and his satellites lost the elections for local authorities. For supporters of the wide opposition front it was the first encouraging sign that his reign days were over. And it was true, but one more bomb was about to explode.

Kosovo crisis

It would be useful to remind that the new Constitution of Serbia adopted in September 1990 (despite the fact that it was against Yugoslav Constitution of 1974) abolished autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Albanian leaders and people didn't want to accept this decision, so they intensified protests during the 1989 and 1990. Milosevic answered in extensive use of his apparatus of repression. As a result, several Serbian police officers and dozens of Albanian demonstrates were killed. In other words, Milosevic answered in usual way, that is, without any strategic approach to the problem. Albanian political leadership, driven away from Serbian political scene, constituted it's own parallel government and parliament. In September 1990 they organized referendum proposing "sovereign and independent state of Kosovo" . About 87% voters that took part positively answered on this proposition. As a result, Albanian people didn't have representatives in the Serbian parliament and didn't take part in any elections, neither at the Serbian, nor at the Yugoslav level.

Between 1990 and 1996 Kosovo problem was largely marginalized by international community because it was focused on wars in Croatia and BIH. During this period, Milosevic has never met with Albanian political representatives and didn't show any will to do so. His strategy was one-sided: without negotiations and widely based on using measures of repression. But, till the end of 1996 peaceful Albanian resistance didn't have any success in changing their position. As a U-turn in Albanian strategy for acquiring "sovereign and independent Kosovo" in April 1996, so-called "UCK" (Liberation Army of Kosovo) was established. Soon after, it undertook armed actions against Kosovo Serbs in four small towns. In fact, UCK was established and consisted of extreme national-chauvinists that wanted to join in Kosovo to Albania . Serbian authorities didn't seriously answer on about 70 UCK armed actions till September 1998 when this military organization killed two Serbian police officers. Serbian police revenged brutally by attacking UCK as well as Albanian civilians. Once put in the motion, spiral of violence has been irretrievable activated. Clash culminated in January 1999 when Serbian police forces killed about 45 Albanian civilians in Kosovo village Racak. It is considered as a key point when international community decided to involve in the resolution of the crisis. In February 1999, international community mediated the meeting between Serbian and Albanian representatives. Meeting was hold in the little French town Rambouillet. But, meeting didn't contribute to the resolution of the crisis because Serbia was offered to sign up document that was unacceptable. More exactly, the essence of document was establishing international protectorate in Kosovo, while NATO troops were allowed to move freely and without limits throughout the territory of FRY including right to use it's air space and territorial waters. Free movement of NATO troops throughout FRY actually put in the question its sovereignty.

Because of Serbian refusal to accept the document NATO air raids began on 24 March 1999 . During the NATO bombing Serbian military forces carried out ethnic cleansing where a lot of Albanian civilians were killed. Under the threats of ethnic cleansing and NATO bombs about 700 000 ethnic Albanians left Kosovo. Apart from causing huge human losses, NATO bombing seriously damaged Serbian industry capacities, transportation, energy and communications infrastructure. Under the treats of further devastating NATO military actions, after 78 days on 10 June, Milosevic was forced to accept Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council. NATO troops entered in Kosovo (but without right to move through the rest of Yugoslav territory), while Serbian army, police and administration were forced to leave. According to Resolution 1244, Kosovo remained within territory of the FRY, but away from any jurisdiction of Yugoslav administration. Peace made possible return of Albanian refugees as well as Albanian revenge against Serbs and other non-Albanians. As a result over 200 000 Serbs and non-Albanians migrated out Kosovo.

 

Finally, on 5 October 2000 Milosevic was forced, after had lost federal parliament and local authority elections on 24 September 2000 (although in the beginning he refused to admit defeat), after thirteen years of bloody reign to give up the role of the leading Serbian politician. Five months latter on 1 April 2001 he was arrested under Yugoslav government charges of abuse of power and corruption. At last in June, under charges for war crimes against humanity and genocide in Croatia , BiH and Kosovo, he was turned over to U.N. War Crimes Tribunal in Hague. Process against Slobodan Milosevic is in progress.

 

C ollapse of Yugoslav economy

War in former Yugoslavia had its long-term, far-reaching tragic reflection on an economic situation. During the period 1990-2000 this region (except Slovenia) has been characterized by the existence of small states preoccupied with ethnic conflicts, whose new emergent elites were closely linked with the state, which secured their economic and social privileges. Their power was based on the state monopoly, which ensured them more reliable and higher profits than they could hope to gain in a free market competition. The ruling oligarchies had come to power mainly with national programs without carrying out adequate social and economic changes. Process of privatization (and also the transition to market economies), to the extent that it was actually implemented (there were several unsuccessful programs of privatization in 1991-1994, 1997-2000), was not transparent. It was rather pursued in line with the interests and under control of special social groups, and through centralized state institutions. Control over national resources was at the same time the main goal and the limitation of these programs.

Consequently for the past ten years FRY has suffered and now Serbia and Montenegro still suffer a heavy crisis of financial credibility and the lack of confidence in important social institutions. Population's foreign exchange savings have been confiscated through numerous mechanisms - "old foreign currency savings" have been blocked and practically expropriated; by inflation melted down value of governments bonds issued for Serbia 's reconstruction; through pyramid schemes of private banks that have been established in collaboration with the ruling oligarchy. Two hyperinflations in a five-year interval (in 1992 yearly inflation was 8993%, while in 1994 yearly inflation reached 15-digit number, 116 trillion percent. Only in January monthly inflation reached 313 million per cent. Graph 1 and Image 1.) had the devastating influence on Yugoslav economy and investments, monetary, fiscal and foreign trade stability. In consequence population lost confidence in the banks, financial system and the state.

The drastic drop of investments (especially in production - Graph 2.) caused a systematic and rapid depreciation of the popular wealth. Insufficient investing practically stopped the modernization of the Yugoslav economy. With old technology and equipment, Yugoslav economy was/is moved away from the world market. The loss of the confidence in economic policy creator's, high political risks and the lack of stable institutional framework resulted in reluctance of foreign capital to engage in the Yugoslav economy, while at the same time domestic capital escaped in search for more "stabile and more peaceful waters".

In identifying the causes of so disturbing economic situation we must not disregard the heavy external shocks, which were beyond the control of economic policy. Firstly, we think on the lost of East-European and Iraqi markets, disintegration of the country and the accompanying colossal loss of markets and sources supply, along with the break-up of numerous technological and managerial ties, and

Secondly, political decisions brought by the EU and USA which primary had their cruel reflection on a sharp drop of common people's living standard, giving to ruling elites an excuse for leading so destructive and dangerous policy (UN sanctions against the FRY, and bombardment of the FRY by the NATO alliance in 1999 ).

Taking together, adverse internal and external shocks resulted in brutal impoverishment of inhabitants. The living standard of common people sharply decreased to the level of Third World countries. In such a way, average monthly salary in Serbia in December 1990 was 752 DM, in December 1993, 21 DM, December 1999, 87 DM and in December 2000 just 70 DM (in December 1990 only 15% of families had an income of less than 100 DM per family member. In 1993 about 50% of families had an income of less than 100 DM per family member. According to Report of the World Bank 2000-2001, in 1999 about 73% of Serbian population had per capita income less than 2 US dollars per day. Bangladesh had 77.8, Rwanda 84.6, Slovenia 2, Slovakia 2, Czech Republic 2, Hungary 4 and Poland 10.5 ).

Consistently, unemployment rate, including hidden unemployment, was close to 50%. Thanks to heavy price control that government used to exercise in order to buy social peace, as well as large unemployment that resulted in permanent fight of majority inhabitants for their existence, shadow market had significantly grown (according to some estimates contribution of the shadow economy to yearly GDP was in 1992, 40.5%; in 1993, 53.2%, 1994, 43.1% and in 1995, 39.4%).

Recorded GDP in current prices declined from about 28.5 billion US dollars in 1990 to about 9 billion US dollars in 2000 (Graph 3). The liabilities on both external and internal level increased rapidly. Yugoslavia 's external debt amounted over 12 billion dollars (Graph 8). About 4.5 billion dollars of old foreign currency savings should be added to this amount. Debt due to interest on external debt was increasing about 600 million US dollars per year, and 130 million US dollars per year in case of liabilities towards the population. Cumulative trade deficit reproduced in balance of payments deficit in respective period was around 16 billion US dollars (Graphs 5, 6, 7). These consequences produced set of specific obstacles, which changed the character of the state and made it less capable and less willing to foster the market oriented institutions. At the same time, enterprises had to a considerable extent adjusted to the non-market, administrative ways of steering economy and were likely to act as a serious obstacle in process of institutional adjustment. In general, the result was a blocked economic transition toward market economy as well as blocked social transformation toward open liberal-democratic society.

 

Conclusion

Being aware of complex situation in the beginning of the nineties, Slobodan Milosevic concentrated from day to day more and more power by using different strategic approach in appealing to different social groups. For orthodox communists and powerful army generals he promoted devotion to ideals of Tito's Yugoslavia , primacy of Serbian interest for nationalist, anti-bureaucratic and economic reforms for intellectuals and economic reforms and greater social justice for workers. That is he was by "selling odds and ends" won over the masses. From the beginning, his reign was, apart from being partly based on majority inhabitant's support, strongly based on a three more supporting pillars: nationalized industry, heavy controlled media and the strong and loyal apparatus of repression - secret and regular police. In such a way, as support of the people decreased so did repression increase.

After had failed to obtain power at the federal level, facing with stronger and stronger political opponents, Ante Markovic as well as Serbian opposition, in order to stay on power, he played a national-chauvinism card. In the first multy-parity elections after WWII in all republics, as well as in Serbia , won nationalistic parties that started from the fact that their stay on power required a reliable support of power more than successful political programs. At the same time, they channeled the mass-media to create an atmosphere in the public opinion wherein the other could only be an enemy. Individuals as a response to growing feeling of social and political insecurity approached to the their ethnicities for support and protection. This could only intensify the social conflicts. Having realized that citizens in Serbia were tired of wars, he became a peacemaker and again transformed into the war leader when NATO imperiled sovereignty of the FRY as well as his dictatorship. After 78 days of devastating NATO bombardment, he was forced to capitulate. At last, he lost the elections on 24 September 2000 , and his bloody reign came to the end. At the moment, Hague process against Slobodan Milosevic, under charges of war crimes against humanity and genocide in Croatia , BiH and Kosovo, is in the progress.

At the end, there are few things I would like to point out.

Firstly, in my opinion Slobodan Milosevic wasn't orthodox communist, populist, nationalist and national-chauvinist. These were only tools that he used in right moments, acting more pragmatically rather than ideologically, to came to, and latter to stay on power.

Secondly , Slobodan Milosevic heavily influenced on drastic rise of the tensions in the region by exercising his uncompromising style and intolerance. It is true that he is the one who has to be blamed most for civil wars with its tragic consequences in former Yugoslavia . However, it is also true that he was not alone. He initiated conflicts on witch Croatian, Bosniak-Muslim and Albanian leaderships reacted merciless and furiously. More exactly, four sides committed war crimes, but only one side is, in my opinion, on trial.

Thirdly , international community, concerning war in former Yugoslavia , exercised one-sided policy indeed. From the beginning foreign politicians as well as media didn't make, or tried to do it but very clumsy, difference between Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian common people lumping them together. So, very often common people were characterized, in the line with Slobodan Milosevic, as a butchers, killers, war criminals etc. This produced rather ambivalent feelings towards international community in individuals that were from the very beginning against Slobodan Milosevic. Also, sanctions that were imposed in 1992 and NATO air raids that took place in 1999 didn't harm Slobodan Milosevic and his clique, but had their cruel reflection on a sharp drop of common people's living standard, giving to ruling elites an excuse for leading so destructive and dangerous policy.

Fourthly , our part of the guilt (thinking on Serbian nation) in these events must not be neglected. Once one wise man said:" But war's a game, which were their subjects wise, Kings would never play".

 

References:

Babic, S. and I. Tasic 2001." Transition Experience and Prospects for Growth . The Case of Serbia and Montenegro ." Working Paper, Rio de Janeiro .

Bulletin G17 Institute No. 1, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

Bulletin G17 Institute No. 4, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

Bulletin G17 Institute No. 6, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

Bulletin G17 Institute No. 10, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

G17 plus, "Bela knjiga Miloseviceve vladavine (The White Book of Milosevic's Reign)." www.g17plus.org.yu/

Jensen, R. 1999 "Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated History." www.lamar.colostate.edu .

Margas, B. "End of the Road for Slobodan Milosevic." Bosnia and East Timor Home Page.

Marsenic, D. 1996." Ekonomika Jugoslavije (Economics of Yugoslavia )." Ekonomski fakultet, Beograd .

Nikolic, M. 2002. "The Tragedy of Yugoslavia - The rise, the reign and the fall of Slobodan Milosevic." Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden .

Petrovic, R. and M. Blagojevic. 1992. "The Migrations of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-1986." Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade .

Radonjic, O. "Yugoslav Lesson (1990-1999)- Consequences of ten year isolation." Part one, www.epunto.ch

Radonjic, O. "Yugoslav Lesson (1990-1999)- Consequences of ten year isolation." Part two, www.epunto.ch

Savich, C. K 2000." The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History." www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm

Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 1974. (Constitution of 1974, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).

Uvalic, M. 2000. "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)." www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/wp18.pdf .

Vujacic, V. 1995. "Serbian Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic and the Origins of the Yugoslav War." The Harriman Review, Vol.8, No.4.

Wintrobe, R. 1999. "Slobodan Milosevic and the Fire of Nationalism." Working paper, econpapers.hhs.se/paper/uwouwowop/9917.htm

World Bank Country Profile Table, Czech Republic , www.worldbank.org

World Bank Country Profile Table, Slovenia , www.worldbank.org

World Bank Country Profile Table, Hungary , www.worldbank.org

World Bank Country Profile Table, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , www.worldbank.org

Zivkovic, A. 1999. "The resistible rise of Slobodan Milosevic." pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/sr230/zivkovic.htm.

 

Appendix: Macroeconomic indicators, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1990-2000)

Graph 1. Yearly inflation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in percent)

Source: Bulletin G17 Institute No. 1, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

 

 

Image 1. A 500 billion-dinar note of the FRY (1993)

 

 

 

Graph 2. Industrial production (1989=100)

Source: Bulletin G17 Institute No. 1, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

 

Graph 3. GDP per capita (in US dollars)

 

Source: Bulletin G17 Institute No. 4, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 6, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 10, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/

 

 

 

Graph 4. GDP per capita (in US dollars)

Source: World Bank Country Profile Table, Czech Republic, World Bank Country Profile Table, Slovenia, World Bank Country Profile Table, Hungary, World Bank Country Profile Table, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, www.worldbank.org

 

 

Graph 5. Imports (in billions of US dollars)

Source: Bulletin G17 Institute No. 4, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 6, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 10, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/ .

 

 

Graph 6. Exports (in billions of US dollars)

Source : Bulletin G17 Institute No. 4, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 6, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 10, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/ .

 

 

Graph 7. Imports, Exports and Trade balance of the FRY (in billion of US dollars)

Bulletin G17 Institute No. 4, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 6, 2000, Bulletin G17 Institute No. 10, 2000, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/ and Babic, S. and I. Tasic 2001." Transition Experience and Prospects for Growth .The Case of Serbia and Montenegro ." Working Paper. Rio de Janeiro .

 

 

Graph 8. Indebtedness against foreigners in comparison with yearly GDP

Source: G17 plus, "Bela knjiga Miloseviceve vladavine (The White Book of Milosevic's Reign)." www.g17plus.org.yu/

A lecture was given on 26 November 2003 in Institute for Human Sciences Vienna, Austria.

http://www.shef.ac.uk/~surc/politics/Definitions_of_Nationalism.html

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/conversi/others.html

Wintrobe, R. (1999)

In January 1944, Anti-Fascist National Council of Kosovo and Metohija adopted Bujan Resolution, which declared that Kosovo and Metohija would join in to Albania . The Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav Army Headquarters rejected Bujan Resolution granting only a regional autonomy status for Kosovo within the Republic Serbia.

Albania as the member of Axis forces ( Germany , Italy and Japan ) during WWII occupied Kosovo. During this period, Serbs and Montenegrins were brutally killed, tortured and persecuted by Albanian military forces. Consequently, thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins were forced to leave Kosovo, while at the same time about 100000 Albanians immigrated into the region.

Unclear definition because, for instance, in Croatia where lived two nationalities both Croats and Serbs had equally right to self-determinate within the same territory.

In that time opposite interests of Serbs and Albanians became visible. In addition, mutual relations were already full of tension.

 

Ustasha (Croat fascists who established and governed Independent State of Croatia ) carried out horrifying genocide against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies during WWII. Under the leadership of Ante Pavelic ustasha killed over 500 000 Serbs, 40 000 Jews and 80 000 Gypsies. Their property was massively confiscated while Orthodox Christian Churches and Jewish Synagogues were robbed and burnt down.

In SFRY non-Slavs like Albanians, Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, Turks and so on were classified as national minorities, while Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosniak-Muslims had status of nationality. Justification rested on the thesis that national minorities have their homeland, while nationalities don't. More exactly, granting status of republic to national minorities would practically lead to creation of second Albania , Hungary , Romania , Germany within the territory of SFRY .

"The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-86."

Sharp increase in economic growth during this period occurred thanks to large foreign loans that were heavily invested in the industrialization of economy.

In 1980, 3.83 billion US dollars; in 1981, 4.061 billion US dollars; in 1982, 4.23 billion US dollars; in 1983, 4.64 billions US dollars and in 1984, 5.22 billion US dollars.

It is worth mentioning that on 28 June 1989 , during the celebration of 600 th anniversary of the Kosovo battle about 1.5 mullion people came to see Milosevic. In his speech, he glorified Serbian heroism and ever lasting love to justice. Furthermore, during this occasion, Milosevic for the first time publicly announced possibility of the armed conflicts in the future.

Foreign factor that significantly influenced not prevention, but the aggravating ethnic conflicts in Croatia , was Germany 's unilateral recognition of Croatian independence under the regime that openly inflamed hatred against Serbs.

Secret meeting between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman that took place in Karadjordjevo ( Serbia ) on March 25 1991 preceded out broke of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina . The goal of the meeting was division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbs and Croats (interesting, at that time Serbs and Croats were already in war).

In next few years, in search for better life about 400 000, mostly well-educated young people that were the foundation of anti-war and democratic movement emigrated.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , proclaimed by the Constitution on 27 April 1992 consisted of the two federal units: the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro . The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was officially dissolved on 4 February 2003 after the Federal Parliament proclaimed the establishment of the state of Serbia and Montenegro.

In words of main American negotiator in the Balkan's, Richard Holbroke, Milosevic became ( suddenly?) their man in Belgrade .

The end of the war and suspension of international sanctions created the basic (formal) conditions for stabilization, recovery and reconstruction of bilateral economic and political relations. But national intolerance as a serious obstacle to normalization of bilateral relations still existed and in my opinion still exists.

Albanian representative, who was picked by US, was extreme national-chauvinist Hashim Taci.

Among other things, accumulated bad loans of well-connected banks and enterprises (so-called "political favorites") have been heavily financed through monetary expansion.

Average rate of investments in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was in 1990, -20.1%; in 1994, -12%; in 1995, -3.7%; in 1996, -5.7%; in 1997, 0.8% and in 1998, -2.2%.

According to the estimations of G17, a group of economic experts, total costs of NATO bombing are about 30 billion US dollars - 4 billion US dollars due to the physical damage (70% of this costs are due to the destruction of industrial capacities), 2.3 billion US dollars due to the lost of human capital and remaining 23 billion US dollars due to the loss of potential GDP that is expected to occur in next ten years. This can be easily seen on Graph 4 where in 2001 and 2002 GDP per capita is even below the level that have been reached, for instance, in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999.

Nikolic, M (2002).

Taking together, external and internal liabilities of Yugoslav economy surpassed (or were about equal to) the amount of annual GDP. It is considered that country is in serious economic and debt problems when the amount of national debt is above 50% of yearly GDP.

More precisely: growing pressures by more developed republics to continue with political and economic decentralization; growing internal pressures for the centralization of power at the federal and republic level as well, in order to protect Serbian national interests; fresh memories on WWII when was carried out genocide against Serbian nation and consistently hostile relations of Serbs with Albanians, Croatians and Bosniak-Muslim; growing national-chauvinism and at the end strong demands for ending the economic crisis and initiation of economic reforms as well as greater social justice.

William Cowper.

 

Ognjen Radonjić